


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1. COMMENT ON SOVIET PROTEST TO IRAN

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The Soviet protest of 12 October against Iranian adherence to the Turkish-Iraqi pact reiterates

Moscow's position as stated previously by Soviet diplomats in both Moscow and Tehran. The USSR has frequently emphasized Article III of the 1927 Soviet-Iranian treaty in which each country agrees not to take part in political alliances or agreements directed against the security of the other. It has also often stressed the fact that the 1921 Soviet-Iranian Treaty of Friendship prohibits Iran from furnishing bases to potential enemies of the USSR.

The strictly conventional phrasing of the protest suggests that the USSR is at present not planning any aggressive moves such as military demonstrations on the Iranian border or abrogation of the Soviet-Iranian treaties. The Soviet Union may, however, obstruct the work of the bilateral commission now demarcating disputed sections of the border and hold up delivery of commodities due under agreements reached last spring.

The USSR may also respond by increasing its efforts with the states south of the "northern tier." In addition it may also make new overtures to Afghanistan, where there is a favorable climate for Soviet penetration resulting from bad feeling toward Pakistan and dissatisfaction with the level of American economic aid.

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2. ISRAEL ASKS WEST'S INTENTIONS ON EGYPTIAN ARMS DEAL

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The Soviet bloc arms deal with Egypt places Israel in a "very serious situation," according to Israeli prime minister Sharett.

He told Ambassador Lawson on 11 October that it is difficult for Israel to plan its policy or discuss foreign policy in parliament without knowing Western plans regarding Egypt's arms deal with Czechoslovakia and Egypt's orientation toward the USSR. Sharett believes there is a need for a "pooling of ideas."

The USSR has "dropped hints" through Poland, Sharett said, that Moscow might permit emigration of Jews to Israel and offer arms if Israel abandons the idea of a security treaty with the United States.

Comment

Israel continues to hope that the Soviet-Egyptian arms deal will induce the United States to supply additional arms and to give a security guarantee. Sharett's reference to possible approaches by the Soviet bloc may be aimed at promoting favorable American consideration of Israeli arms requests. At present Moscow would probably not risk alienating the Arab states by supplying arms to Israel.

Israel's dedication to the return of Jews to the "homeland" might induce it to consider a Soviet offer, but not one which would require it to abandon the idea of a security treaty with the United States.

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4. COMMENT ON CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT IN LAOS

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The cease-fire agreement reached at Rangoon on 11 October by Lao-tian government and Pathet Lao representatives provides for a ces-

sation of hostilities in ten days and the establishment of a neutral zone between opposing forces. According to the government negotiators, however, it is contingent on the settlement of other basic issues, including the question of re-establishing royal government administration in the two northern provinces of Laos. The talks in Rangoon have broken down, and these unresolved problems have been referred back to the negotiating teams in Vientiane.

Most of the truce agreement's terms are merely a reiteration of the terms of the 9 March cease-fire agreement, which was short-lived. A major difference is the clause prohibiting any military reinforcements in the two disputed provinces. A Laotian official has explained this provision by stating that the government has no intention of increasing its strength in the Pathet Lao areas, and that in any case the entire agreement is provisional.



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